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THE PUBLIC CHARGE RULE AS PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY
MEDHA D. MAKHLOUF*
INTRODUCTION
A recent Gallup poll found that health care, the economy, and immigration
are the top three most important political issues for U.S. voters.1 Public charge
policy—which relates to the admission of noncitizens based on the likelihood of
dependence on the U.S. government for support—lies at the intersection of these
three topics. At the same time, immigration and welfare reform are prominent
agenda items for the current administration.2 
Noncitizens are subject to a public charge determination when they apply for
a visa to travel to the United States, when they arrive at a port of entry, and when
they apply for lawful permanent resident status.3 On October 10, 2018, the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) released a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that would transform public charge policy that has existed for more
than a century.4 The proposed rule would expand the application of public charge
inadmissibility in several ways, such as considering an applicant’s enrollment in
previously-excluded public benefit programs and identifying certain
characteristics as “heavily weighed” negative factors in the test.5 One analysis
found ninety-four percent of noncitizens who entered the United States without
lawful permanent resident status had at least one characteristic that would be
weighed negatively under the proposed rule, and forty-two percent had
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organizers of and participants in the Indiana Health Law Review Symposium for inspiring this
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1. Frank Newport, Top Issues for Voters: Healthcare, Economy, Immigration, GALLUP
(Nov. 2, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/244367/top-issues-voters-healthcare-economy-
immigration.aspx [https://perma.cc/9NGF-4MX2].
2. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: A NEW
FOUNDATION FOR AMERICAN GREATNESS 15-17 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/budget.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NER-E6T8].  
3. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (2014) (defining “admission”
and “admitted” to mean “the lawful entry of [an] alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer”); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (2008) (“An alien . . . who arrives
in the United States . . . shall be deemed for purposes of this Act an applicant for admission.”). An
alien who has not been admitted to the United States is subject to the inadmissibility grounds under
Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2008) (relating to applications for adjustment
of status to lawful permanent resident).
4. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (Oct. 10, 2018) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, and 248), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
FR-2018-10-10/pdf/2018-21106.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KUV-3U6V]. 
5. Id. at 51,173 (proposing to consider previously excluded public benefit programs); id. at
51,198 (describing heavily weighed negative factors). 
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characteristics that would be considered heavily weighed negative factors.6
Common entrant characteristics that would be weighed negatively include having
a household size of three or more, not having private health coverage, and not
having a high school diploma—factors that have little or nothing to do with
dependency on the government per se.7 The proposed rule was swiftly criticized
by advocacy organizations focused on immigrants’ rights, access to health care,
disability rights, and workers’ rights, among others.8 One category of objection
to the proposed rule focuses on the negative impact on the health and welfare of
the immigrant population residing in the United States.9 
This essay identifies concern for public health as a factor in the development
of public charge policy and demonstrates how the proposed rule abandons this
rationale. Part I describes how public charge policy has remained remarkably
consistent over time, even when anti-immigrant sentiment and concerns about the
costs of providing public benefits to immigrants brought about restrictions on
immigrant access to public benefits. Part II demonstrates how the public health
rationale has influenced the development of public charge policy. Part III argues
that the changes to public charge policy proposed in October 2018 represent a
departure from the longstanding incorporation of public health concerns into
public charge policy. I argue that the proposed changes are tied to a broader
6. Samantha Artiga et al., Estimated Impacts of the Proposed Public Charge Rule on
Immigrants and Medicaid, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.kff.org/
report-section/estimated-impacts-of-the-proposed-public-charge-rule-on-immigrants-and-
medicaide-key-findings/ [https://perma.cc/YHW5-J8GX]. 
7. Id. 
8. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds: USCIS Proposed Rule, 19-01 IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS 1, 22 (Jan. 2019) (noting that the proposed rule “has come under fire from a number of
individuals and organizations that represent or lobby on behalf of immigrants” and that “over
200,000 comments had been submitted”). See, e.g., Public Charge: A New Threat to Immigrant
Families, PROTECTING IMMIGRANT FAMILIES  (Oct. 2018), https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/
files/2018_publiccharge_blackandwhite.pdf [https://perma.cc/97A9-CKU7] (immigrant rights);
ACLU Publishes Comments Criticizing Proposed Rule on Public Charge: Trump Administration
Proposal Aims to Block Immigrants with Disabilities, ACLU (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/
news/aclu-publishes-comments-criticizing-proposed-rule-public-charge [https://perma.cc/GR8R-
UA4T] (disability rights); ACP Vows to “Do What it Takes’ to Protect Immigrants” Access to
Health Care, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS (Oct. 19, 2018),  https://www.acponline.org
/advocacy/acp-advocate/archive/october-19-2018/acp-vows-to-do-what-it-takes-to-protect-
immigrants-access-to-health-care [https://perma.cc/HCG2-DSNM] (health care access); Statement
on Trump Administration’s Proposed “Public Charge” Rule Denying Poor People the Opportunity
for Immigration Status and Citizenship, HARVESTING JUST.: A BLOG BY FARMWORKER JUST. (Sept.
24, 2018), https://www.farmworkerjustice.org/fj-blog/2018/09/statement-trump-administration-s-
proposed-public-charge-rule-denying-poor-people [https://perma.cc/JY8Q-JTZV] (workers’ rights). 
9. See, e.g., Am. Pub. Health Ass’n, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Inadmissibility
on Public Charge Grounds (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.apha.org/-/media/files/pdf/advocacy/
testimonyandcomments/181210_apha_public_charge_comments.ashx?la=en&hash=56A1A126
FC49D31E1766368617B2284942A01B70 [https://perma.cc/5ZAP-QRPG]. 
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agenda of more generally restricting access to health-supporting public benefits.
Finally, I make a normative case for maintaining the current limitations on public
charge policy’s consideration of public benefits use by noncitizens.  
I. THE DURABILITY OF PUBLIC CHARGE POLICY OVER TIME
Public charge has been a part of immigration law ever since the federal
government began comprehensively regulating immigration in the late nineteenth
century.10 However, the roots of public charge can be traced to the colonial poor
laws, which permitted localities to prevent from settling or removing outsiders
who sought shelter or other necessities.11 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, more noncitizens were refused admission to and deported from the
United States under the public charge law than under any other category of
inadmissibility or deportability.12 Although public charge remains a barrier to
admission for noncitizens, the percentage of noncitizens refused admission on this
ground has decreased since 1940.13 Here, I trace the development of public charge
law from its roots in colonial jurisdictions, to its incorporation into state law in
the early years of the republic, and its ultimate expression as federal immigration
law. The enduring dual principles at the heart of public charge policy are
henceforth revealed: an effort to promote the entry of able-bodied and
employable immigrants and, importantly, a commitment to assist members of the
community who fall on hard times.14 
A. Historical Precedents of Public Charge Law
Early settlers in the United States established “poor laws” that were modeled
on the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, and the Law of Settlement and Removal
of 1662.15 The purpose of the poor laws was to establish governmental authority
to provide aid to the poor.16 At the time, aid came primarily in the form of shelter
in almshouses (also known as poorhouses or workhouses), which also provided
food, clothes, and other necessities of life.17 The poor laws categorized poor or
10. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214. 
11. Torrie Hester et al., Historians’ Comment on Proposed Rule on Inadmissibility on Public
Charge Grounds (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.ilcm.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Historians-
comment-FR-2018-21106.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3HH-5WMW]. 
12. Id. at 3. 
13. JEANNE BATALOVA, MICHAEL FIX, AND MARK GREENBERG, CHILLING EFFECTS: THE
EXPECTED PUBLIC CHARGE RULE AND ITS IMPACT ON LEGAL IMMIGRANT FAMILIES’ PUBLIC
BENEFITS USE 7 (2018).
14. See Hester et al. passim, supra note 11. 
15. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 628 n.7 (1969). 
16. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1972) (discussing the history
and purpose of the poor laws). 
17. John E. Hansan, Poor Relief in Early America, VCU LIBR.: SOC. WELFARE HIST.
PROJECT, https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/programs/poor-relief-early-amer/ [https://perma.
cc/L6R5-R9NM] (last modified Oct. 17, 2018).
180 INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:177
otherwise dependent people as “worthy (e.g., orphans, widows, handicapped, frail
elderly) and . . . unworthy (e.g. drunkards, shiftless, lazy).”18 These classifications
determined the type of relief for which a person would qualify.19 Poor laws also
established the length of time that persons must have resided in a town before
they became eligible for public aid.20 Such categorizations of the “deserving” and
“undeserving” poor and residency requirements persist in welfare programs to
this day.21 
Although almshouses were open to the merely unlucky or temporarily
unemployed, they “became a refuge for the sick, the severely disabled, frail
elderly, and homeless children who were unable to work and had no one to care
for them.”22 Dr. Victoria Sweet, a physician and historian who worked in “the last
almshouse in America,” writes:
At one time, almost every county in the United States had an almshouse
. . . as well as a county hospital. They had functioned together. The
county hospital took care of the acutely ill, and the almshouse took care
of the chronically disabled. In theory. In practice, the almshouse had
been a catchall for everyone who didn’t fit someplace else—it was a
shelter, a farm for the unemployed, a halfway house, and a rehabilitation
center, as well as a hospital.23
The poor laws required localities to provide for the basic needs of residents who
were unable to provide for themselves. However, maintenance of almshouses was
expensive.24 Therefore, the corollary to this obligation of providing assistance
was the right of localities to prohibit dependent persons (or persons who were
likely to become dependent) from residing in the jurisdiction if they had not
already established residency at the time they became impoverished.25 The poor
laws also provided the authority to expel or remove such persons from the
18. Id. See also, Elizabeth Wisner, The Puritan Background of the New England Poor Laws,
19 SOC. SERV. REV. 381 (1945).
19. Wisner, supra note 18, at 384.
20. See, e.g., An Act Ascertaining What Shall Constitute A Legal Settlement Of Any Person
In Any Town Or District Within This Commonwealth, So As To Entitle Him To Support Therein
In Case He Becomes Poor And Stands In Need Of Relief And For Repealing All Laws Heretofore
Made Respecting Such Settlement, ch. 0034, 1793 Mass. Acts (“Any person, being a citizen as
aforesaid and of the age of Twenty one years, who shall hereafter reside in any Town or District
with this Commonwealth for the space of Ten years together and pay all State, County, Town or
District taxes assessed on such person's poll or estate for any Five years within said time, shall
thereby gain settlement in such Town or District.”). 
21. Lauren D. Appelbaum, The Influence of Perceived Deservingness on Policy Decisions
Regarding Aid to the Poor, 22 POL. PSYCHOL. 419, 419-20 (2001). 
22. Hansan, supra note 17.
23. VICTORIA SWEET, GOD’S HOTEL: A DOCTOR, A HOSPITAL, AND A PILGRIMAGE TO THE
HEART OF MEDICINE 8 (2012). 
24. Hansan, supra note 17.
25. Id.
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jurisdiction if they did not leave willingly.26 
After the establishment of the republic, colonial poor laws were transformed
into laws governing the entry of outsiders into states like New York and
Massachusetts.27 The origins of poverty-related immigration restrictions in the
United States lie in these individual state laws, in that they authorized noncitizen
entry into the jurisdiction and enabled the deportation of noncitizen residents for
specified reasons.28 For example, anti-Irish sentiment motivated the development
of an 1837 law in Massachusetts which authorized the exclusion of immigrants
who had been impoverished in any other country, or who suffered from health
conditions that would prevent them from supporting themselves.”29 These state
public charge laws were the basis for the incorporation of public charge exclusion
and deportation provisions in the first federal immigration laws.30
B. Public Charge in Early Immigration Law
The first comprehensive federal immigration law, passed in 1882, included
a provision denying entry to “any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to
take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge.”31 In 1891, the
law was broadened to exclude not only those who were unable to provide for
themselves at the time of entry, but also those who were “likely to become a
26. See, e.g., THE HONORABLE GEN. COURT OF MASS., ACTS AND LAWS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE RELIEF AND SUPPORT,
EMPLOYMENT AND REMOVAL OF THE POOR, AND FOR REPEALING ALL FORMER LAWS MADE FOR
THOSE PURPOSES 491-92 (Boston, Wright & Porter Printing Co. 1895).  
27. See N.Y. (STATE) COMM’RS OF EMIGRATION, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE COMMISSIONERS
OF EMIGRATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK: FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF COMMISSION,
TOGETHER WITH TABLES AND REPORTS, & OTHER OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. COMP. AND PREPARED
UNDER RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE BD., AUG. 29, 1860, 12 (1861) (prohibiting the entry of “any
lunatic, idiot, deaf and dumb, blind or infirm persons, not members of emigrating families, and who
. . . are likely to become permanently a public charge”); THE HONORABLE GEN. COURT OF MASS.,
ACTS AND RESOLVES PASSED BY THE GENERAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, AN ACT RELATING TO
ALIEN PASSENGERS 339 (Dutton and Wentworth 1850) (describing the bond or fee that shipmasters
were required to pay for each arriving alien, ensuring that he or she is not “a pauper, lunatic, or
idiot, or maimed, aged, infirm or destitute, or incompetent to take care of himself or herself,
without becoming a public charge as a pauper”); MASS. COMM’RS OF ALIEN PASSENGERS &
FOREIGN PAUPERS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF ALIEN PASSENGERS AND FOREIGN PAUPERS
5-6 (1852) (regarding “the establishment of four district almshouses for the accommodation of all
aliens who become a public charge upon the Commonwealth”). 
28. HIDETAKA HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR: ATLANTIC SEABOARD STATES AND THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 180-204 (2017). 
29. Id. at 55 (quoting THE HONORABLE GEN. COURT OF MASS., ACTS AND RESOLVES PASSED
BY THE GENERAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, AN ACT RELATING TO ALIEN PASSENGERS 339,
Dutton and Wentworth 1850). 
30. Id. at 182.
31. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376 § 2, 22 Stat. 214 (regulating immigration).  
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public charge.”32 An additional provision authorized the deportation of any
noncitizen who “becomes a public charge within one year after his arrival in the
United States from causes existing prior to his landing therein.”33 In 1917, this
provision was amended to authorize the deportation of noncitizens who become
a public charge within five years of arrival, which remains the law today.34 Two
important insights to draw from the law of public charge deportability are: (1)
that noncitizens who resided in the United States longer than one year had
established residency of some sort, and were therefore no longer subject to
deportability under the public charge ground; and (2) that a noncitizen would not
be deported for becoming a public charge within one year for causes that arose
after his or her arrival in the United States.35 Rather, such persons, having
established residency or having fallen on hard times after entry, were eligible for
public support.
The deportability ground was limited to noncitizens who were expected to be
dependent on public aid for basic needs for the foreseeable future, with residence
in public charitable institutions such as almshouses and hospitals as the paradigm
of substantial dependence.36 Use of other public benefits that emerged in the early
twentieth century, such as English classes or public health programs, were not
considered in determinations of public charge deportability as their purpose was
to integrate immigrants rather than to support them financially.37 This was true
under the colonial poor laws as well as under state and early federal immigration
laws.38 Although the majority of exclusions and deportations of noncitizens in the
early- to mid-twentieth century were attributable to the public charge laws,
historians have noted that “the number . . . remained small, especially when
compared to the numbers admitted.”39 
C. The Expansion of Public Benefits
During the twentieth century, state and federal—as opposed to
local—governments became increasingly responsible for the design and
administration of a broad array of public benefit programs. This shift was set in
32. 1891 Immigration Act, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
33. Id.
34. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874.
35. Id.
36.  Hester et al., supra note 11, at 3; IMMIGRATION SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 10 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1896), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=osu.32435027600600;
view=1up;seq=16 (stating that “no immigrant landed in this country within [Fiscal Year 1895-96] 
is now a burden upon any public or private institution); id. (also noting that 1,946 immigrants “fell
into temporary distress and became public charges” from causes arising within one year after entry,
but they were not returned to their country of origin). 
37. Hester et al., supra note 11, at 4.
38. Id. at 3. 
39. Id. 
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motion by the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935.40 In addition to
establishing Social Security retirement benefits, the Act created three new federal
programs to provide need-based income support (what we now call “welfare”) to
people who fit within specified categories of the deserving poor: fatherless
children, the aged, and the blind.41 The first laws to authorize permanent,
federally-funded housing were also enacted in the 1930s.42 The 1960s and 1970s
saw another large expansion of public benefit programs, including the
establishment of Medicaid, Medicare, Food Stamps, Head Start, and job training
programs and child care for parents receiving welfare.43 
Throughout this period, as the array of public benefit programs expanded
dramatically, the public charge ground of deportability remained a little-used
provision of immigration law, in part because its main limitations are enshrined
in statute: it can only be invoked for causes existing prior to entry and only for
a limited period following a noncitizen’s entry.44 In 1948, application of public
charge deportability became even more restrictive when the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), the appellate administrative body for interpreting
immigration laws, established a new three-part test in Matter of B-.45 In order to
establish that a noncitizen is deportable under the public charge ground, (1) the
state must have imposed a charge upon the noncitizen for services rendered; (2)
the state must have demanded payment from the noncitizen; and (3) the
noncitizen must have failed to pay the charge.46 Deportations based on public
charge remain rare.47
40. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620; KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF
DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935-1972 3 (Cambridge
University Press 2016). 
41. Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 829 (2015). The programs were
called Aid to Dependent Children, Old Age Assistance, and Aid to the Blind. Id.
42. National Housing (Capehart) Act of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (enacted June 27, 1934);
U.S. Housing (Wagner-Steagall) Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (enacted September 1, 1937).
43. Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2011 et seq. (1964); Social Security Act, 7
U.S.C.A. § 1396 (Title XIX on Medicaid); Social Security Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1395 (Title XVIII on
Medicare); Economic Opportunity Act of 1965, Pub. L. 88-452 (creating Head Start); Social
Security Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 601 et. seq. (funding child care services for parents receiving Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, in order to allow them to participate in work and training
programs; establishing WIN Child Care Services to enable parents receiving AFDC to participate
in the Work Incentive (WIN) Program); Social Security Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1397a (expanding
eligibility for subsidized child care to low-income families not receiving AFDC). 
44. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5) (2008) (“Any alien who, within
five years after the date of entry, has become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown
to have arisen since entry is deportable.”).
45. Matter of B-, 3 I&N Dec. 323 (BIA 1948).  
46. Id. at 326. 
47. Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed.
Reg. 28,689, 28,691 (May 26, 1999).
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Public charge deportation policy continued to echo the dual principles
described in the previous section: once noncitizens become members of the
community, they are eligible to receive the full array of public benefits without
any danger of being removed from the country. Historians have noted the logic
behind this principle: “[t]o deport an immigrant who became ill or disabled from
causes subsequent to entry would unfairly hold the country of origin responsible
and contradict the intent of the inadmissibility grounds.”48 For example, during
the Great Depression, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) did not
consider noncitizens deportable if they received public aid on account of
unemployment.49 In addition, there seemed to be an implicit recognition that
access to public benefits would help to integrate immigrants and ensure their
long-term self-sufficiency. Even in cases in which deportation under the public
charge ground was warranted, courts frequently used their discretion to suspend
deportation based on the principle of promoting integration.50 
Throughout the expansion of federal public benefit programs in the twentieth
century, public charge policy as it related to both inadmissibility and deportability
remained remarkably consistent.51 Public charge policies in each context are
distinct, but related. The dual principles underlying the policy of public charge
deportability have strongly influenced the development of public charge
inadmissibility: Noncitizens who are considered members of the community are
eligible to receive an array of public benefits without the threat of negative
immigration consequences. In both contexts, public charge determinations did not
consider use of public benefits that were intended to subsidize health care (other
than for long-term institutional care), housing, and food.52 Such programs were
understood to supplement rather than fully provide for the basic needs of low-
income people.53 For example, receipt of public health services such as
immunizations or medical treatments to ensure healthy development (prenatal
care, for example) was not considered evidence of dependence.54 Only public
benefit programs that provided long-term institutionalization and cash benefits
48. Hester et al., supra note 11, at 4. 
49. MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA 72 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2004). 
50. See Leo M. Alpert, The Alien and the Public Charge Clauses, 49 YALE L. J. 18, 22 (1939)
(describing cases in which the public charge deportability clause was not applied to noncitizen
families who were supported by welfare). 
51. Hester et al., supra note 11, at 1.
52. Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed.
Reg. 28,689 (May 26, 1999) (“It has never been Service policy that any receipt of services or
benefits paid for in whole or in part from public funds renders an alien a public charge, or indicates
that the alien is likely to become a public charge. The nature of the public program must be
considered.”).
53. Id. at 28,689, 28,692 (“[N]on-cash benefits (other than institutionalization for long-term
care) are by their nature supplemental”); id. (excluding Food Stamps from the Department of
State’s public charge inadmissibility determination because of its “supplemental” nature).
54. Id. at 28,693.
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were considered in the public charge determination, as reliance on such benefits
was believed to indicate substantial dependence on government support.55
In their applications for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident,
noncitizens are subject to a “totality of the circumstances” analysis in order to
determine whether they are likely to become a public charge.56 Use of public
benefits while living in the United States is one factor among many—including
age, health, family status, education, assets, resources, and financial status—used
to assess the likelihood that a noncitizen is inadmissible under the public charge
ground.57 The different analyses for public charge inadmissibility and
deportability reflect the forward-looking and backward-looking nature of the
examinations, respectively. Public charge deportability has to do with whether a
noncitizen has come to the United States without intending to rely on government
support and has since become a member of the community whom the State is
obligated to support. For this reason, the analysis focuses on use of certain public
benefits that indicate total, or near-total, dependence on the government within
a noncitizen’s first five years of entry, for reasons predating that entry.58
Inadmissibility, on the other hand, is concerned with whether a noncitizen is
“likely to become a public charge at some future time.”59 Therefore, the
inadmissibility test assesses a broader array of factors that suggest whether a
noncitizen is likely to become totally or nearly totally dependent on the
government for support in the future.60  
D. Restrictions on Immigrant Eligibility for Public Benefits
Throughout most of the twentieth century, noncitizens were generally eligible
55. Alpert, supra note 50, at 22-28 (describing residence in charitable institutions and
“welfare relief” as the principal types of public assistance considered in public charge
determinations); id. at 23 (“It is the type of relief today usually called general public assistance,
welfare relief, or home relief, that is the modern counterpart of the pauper, almshouse and charity
concept.”)
56. Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed.
Reg. 28,689 (May 26, 1999).
57. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(4)(B); see also 9 FAM 302.8-2(B)(2)(a)(2),
302.8-2(B)(3)(a)(1) (2016). 
58. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(5). 
59. Matter of Harutunian, 14 I&N Dec. at 589. 
60. See id. at 588 (“The administrative authorities have adopted the view that, while
economic factors should be taken into account, the alien’s physical and mental condition, as it
affects ability to earn a living, is of major significance.”); 1950 OMNIBUS REPORT OF THE SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 346-50 (2d Sess. 1950) (“Since the elements
constituting likelihood of becoming a public charge are varied, there should be no attempt to define
the term in the law, but rather to establish the specific qualification that the determination of
whether an alien falls into that category rests within the discretion of the consular officers or the
Commissioner.”). 
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for public aid.61 This included eligibility for the major benefit programs enacted
in the 1960s, such as Medicaid,62 Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(“AFDC,” the successor program to Aid to Dependent Children),63 Food
Stamps,64 and federal housing assistance programs.65 In general, at the time such
programs were created, eligibility criteria related to citizenship or immigration
status did not exist.66 However, reform of the immigration laws in 1965 caused
an increase in immigration, including among undocumented immigrants, which
led to closer scrutiny of the costs of providing access to public benefits for
immigrants.67 In the 1970s, new laws began to restrict undocumented immigrants’
61. Cybelle Fox, Unauthorized Welfare: The Origins of Immigrant Status Restrictions in
American Social Policy, 102 J. AM. HIST., 1051, 1057 (2016). (“Between 1935 and 1971 no federal
laws barred noncitizens, even unauthorized immigrants, from social security benefits,
unemployment insurance, [Old Age Assistance], or ADC . . . . With the enactment of additional
public assistance legislation—creating the food stamp program or Medicaid, for example—the
same rules applied. Under federal law, both authorized and unauthorized immigrants were eligible
for these programs on the same basis as citizens.”); Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Non-
Citizens’ Access to Public Benefits, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1475, 1492-93 (1994) (“It was not until
approximately 1972 that Congress began to enact restrictions on access to benefit programs based
on either immigration or citizenship status.”); see also Tanya Broder et al., , Overview of Immigrant
Eligibility for Federal Programs, NAT’L IMMIG. L. CTR. (2015), https://www.nilc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/overview-immeligfedprograms-2015-12-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6QA-
5E9W]. 
62. Janet M. Calvo, Alien Status Restrictions on Eligibility for Federally Funded Assistance
Programs, 16 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC. CHANGE 395, 418 (1987-88) (“The first federal restriction
on the availability of Medicaid to aliens was a regulation which limited eligibility to legal
permanent residents and aliens permanently residing in the United States under color of law.”)
(citing 45 C.F.R. § 248 (1973)). 
63. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2320(a)(3), 95 Stat. 357, 857
(1981) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(33) (Supp. IV 1986) (limiting eligibility for AFDC
to aliens who are permanent residents or “permanently residing in the United States under color of
law” (PRUCOL)); Fox, supra note 61, at 1057 (“By 1948 only Texas barred noncitizens from ADC
benefits”); Boswell, supra note 61, at 1489 (“In order to be eligible, a dependent child and all in
his or her ‘assistance unit’ must be either U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, or PRUCOL
. . . [I]t seems that deportable persons who are present and allowed to remain in the United States
with the knowledge of the INS may be eligible to receive benefits under PRUCOL.”) (internal
citations omitted). 
64. Boswell, supra note 61, at 1490 (describing immigration status eligibility criteria for
Food Stamp recipients, which were more restrictive than for the other programs mentioned); Calvo,
supra note 62, at 402-03 (describing restrictions on the eligibility of aliens for Food Stamps before
and after the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986). 
65. Calvo, supra note 62, at 408 (“In 1981, Congress limited the eligibility for federally
assisted housing programs to aliens in specific statuses.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1436a(a) (1982)). 
66. See Fox, supra note 61, at 1053 (“When the modern welfare state was established in 1935
no federal laws barred non-citizens, even unauthorized immigrants, from social assistance.”).  
67. See id. at 1054 (“The roots of federal restriction . . . stretch back to the 1960s, when
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access to federal public benefits, including Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”)—a new program—in 1972,68 Medicaid and AFDC in 1973, Food Stamps
in 1974, federal unemployment insurance in 1976.69 
In 1996, Congress passed welfare reform legislation that severely restricted
lawful immigrants’ access to federal public benefits.70 These restrictions aimed
to reduce federal spending on public benefit programs and to deter noncitizens
from coming to the United States to access public benefits.71 The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”) created
two categories of immigrants for purposes of eligibility for federal public
benefits: qualified aliens and non-qualified aliens.72 The term “qualified alien”
does not originate in immigration law, and the category includes noncitizens with
many different types of statuses, including lawful permanent residents and
humanitarian immigrants such as refugees and asylees.73 Qualified aliens are
barred from eligibility for federal public benefits until five years after the date
they become qualified, a provision commonly referred to as the “five-year bar.”74
In general, non-qualified aliens are not eligible for federal programs that provide
changes in immigration and welfare policy led to an unexpected rise in unauthorized migration and
an expansion of the welfare rolls.”). 
68. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 1614(a)(1)(B)(ii), 86 Stat.
1329, 1471; Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, 52 Fed. Reg. 21,939
(June 10, 1987), 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618 (1988) (stating that aliens are eligible for SSI if they are
permanent residents, temporary residents, special agricultural workers, replenishment agricultural
workers, or PRUCOL); Fox, supra note 61, at 1055 (describing how “[f]or almost four decades
social security officials interpreted [the Act] to mean that unauthorized immigrants were . . .
eligible for” programs administered by the SSA); Boswell, supra note 61, at 1490. 
69. Fox, supra note 61, at 1059; see Boswell, supra note 61, at 1492-93; Calvo, supra note
62, at 418, 420-21 (regarding restrictions on the eligibility of aliens for Medicaid from 1973-1988
and for AFDC from 1981-1987).
70. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. §
1612 (1996).
71. H.R. REP. NO. 104-430, at 146 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2105, 2260
(describing the two main objectives of PRWORA as “to assure that aliens be self-reliant in
accordance with national immigration policy . . . [and] to remove the incentive for illegal
immigration provided by the availability of public benefits.”). However, it is far from certain
whether restricting immigrant eligibility for public benefits accomplishes either goal, a topic I
explore in prior work. See Medha D. Makhlouf, Health Justice for Immigrants, 4 U. PENN. J.L. &
PUB. AFF. 235, 266-71 (2019).
72. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (Aug. 22, 1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
73. PRWORA § 431(b), 110 Stat. at 2274 (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)); see also William
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122
Stat. 5063 § 211 (Dec. 23, 2008) (adding certain survivors of trafficking to the definition of
“qualified alien”). 
74. PRWORA § 431, 110 Stat. 2105, 2274 (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1641). Exemptions from
the five-year bar to certain categories of immigrants, such as refugees and asylees. 8 U.S.C. § 1612.
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“any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing,
postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other
similar benefit.”75 However, certain federally funded programs that support health
and well-being remain accessible to noncitizens regardless of status.76 These
include emergency Medicaid; public health programs that provide immunizations
and treatment of communicable disease symptoms; school breakfast and lunch
programs; K-12 public education; the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program
for Women, Infants, and Children (“WIC”); short-term non-cash emergency
disaster assistance; and Head Start.77 
This dramatic—but not total—restriction on immigrants’ eligibility for
federal public benefits necessitated clarification from the INS about how use of
public benefits would impact inadmissibility and deportability under the public
charge ground. In 1999, the INS released a Field Guidance defining a “public
charge” as “an alien who has become (for deportation purposes) or who is likely
to become (for admission or adjustment purposes) ‘primarily dependent on the
government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either the receipt of public cash
assistance for income maintenance, or institutionalization for long-term care at
government expense.’”78 This policy accurately reflects the historical principles
underlying public charge, in that it takes into consideration use of public benefits
that would indicate “a complete, or nearly complete, dependence on the
Government rather than the mere receipt of some lesser level of financial
support.”79 Under this policy, which is still in effect, immigration officers
consider use of public benefits as a factor in the public charge determination only
if an applicant for adjustment of status has received SSI, cash assistance from
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF,” the successor to AFDC),
state or local cash assistance programs for income maintenance, or Medicaid for
long-term care in a nursing home or mental health institution.80 INS reached this
decision after consulting with the Social Security Administration, the Department
of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Agriculture, concluding
that “non-cash benefits generally provide supplementary support in the form of
vouchers or direct services to support nutrition, health, and living condition
needs.”81 There was also an implicit understanding that such benefits “are often
75. PRWORA § 401(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 2113 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 601). 
76. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611(b), 1613(c). 
77. Id.; see also 83 Fed. Reg. 51,128, Table 3 (listing programs that are exceptions from the
definition of federal public benefit under PRWORA); 83 Fed. Reg. 51,131-32 (describing exempted
programs in detail). 
78. Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed.
Reg. 28,689 (May 26, 1999). See also Dep’t of State, 9 FAM 302.8-2(B)(1)(a)(1) (defining “public
charge” in the same way).
79. Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,676, 28,677
(May 26, 1999). 
80. Id.
81. Id. at 28,677-78. Public benefits that are not currently considered in the public charge
determination include Medicaid: public health services; use of community health clinics; short-term
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provided to low-income working families to sustain and improve their ability to
remain self-sufficient.”82 Provision of such benefits to noncitizens—even during
a period of increasing concern over the costs of social welfare programs and the
volume of new immigrants—was understood as the nation’s “commitment to
assist members of our communities who fall on hard times,” and not as a basis for
punitive immigration consequences.83 
Relatedly, humanitarian immigrants such as refugees and asylees who are
exempt from the five-year bar on eligibility for federal public benefits are also
exempt from the public charge grounds of inadmissibility and deportation.84 It is
broadly understood that such immigrants often come into the country with few
resources, and that providing immediate access to public benefits to them without
any risk of negative immigration consequences is good policy for promoting their
long-term self-sufficiency.
II. PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PUBLIC CHARGE POLICY
Public health concerns have influenced the development of public charge
policy. Public health is defined as what “we as a society do collectively to assure
the conditions in which people can be healthy.”85 Public benefits programs are a
collectively-funded safety net designed to promote public health and create other
positive effects on society by addressing the social determinants of health
(“SDoH”).86 The World Health Organization defines SDoH as “the conditions in
which people are born, grow, work, live, and age, and the wider set of forces and
systems shaping the conditions of daily life.”87 The SDoH are widely
rehabilitation services; prenatal care and emergency medical services; CHIP; nutrition programs;
housing benefits; child care services; energy assistance; emergency disaster relief; foster care and
adoption assistance; educational assistance; job training programs; in-kind, community based
programs such as soup kitchens, crisis counseling, etc.; non-cash benefits under TANF (subsidized
child care or transit subsidies); earned cash payments such as Social Security; government pensions
and veterans benefits; and unemployment compensation. Hester et al., supra note 11, at 7-8.
82. 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,678. See also id. at 28,678 (“Non-cash benefits . . . are by their nature
supplemental and frequently support the general welfare.”). 
83. Hester et al., supra note 11, at 9. By highlighting these assumptions underlying the
development of public charge policy, I do not intend to minimize the problematic way in which
public charge has been used to exclude “undesired” groups throughout the nation’s history. This
is due in part to the broad, readily abusable discretion that consular and border officials have in
making public charge determinations. See, e.g., Douglas C. Baynton, Defectives in the Land:
Disability and American Immigration Policy, 24 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 31, 33 (2005).
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(b)(1) (2019) (exemption from five-year bar); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)
(2019) (exemption from public charge ground of inadmissibility).
85. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1998).
86. See generally ELIZABETH H. BRADLEY & LAUREN A. TAYLOR, THE AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE PARADOX: WHY SPENDING MORE IS GETTING US LESS (2013). 
87. Social Determinants of Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/social_
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acknowledged to have a significant effect on individual and population health,
although the precise mechanisms of causation are complex and not fully
understood.88
The laws governing public benefit programs, which redistribute public
resources to ameliorate the grossest inequalities in society (lack of basic
necessities like food and shelter) are prime examples of “incidental health law,”
or “policies that are not primarily focused on health, but may nonetheless be
creating health benefits or harms.”89 Although immigration laws are less
commonly considered incidental health laws, public charge policy is unique in
that, for a significant subpopulation within the United States, it can directly
influence the decision to access subsidized health coverage and other health-
promoting public benefits.90 Section II.A describes the relationship between
financial resource strain, the SDoH, and public benefit programs. Section II.B
identifies instances in which the INS and its successor, the DHS, have explicitly
and implicitly recognized public health rationales in developing public charge
policy. 
A. Financial Resource Strain and Social Determinants of Health
Public benefit programs address SDoH by providing direct services,
vouchers, or cash benefits to people who are experiencing financial resource
strain. The American Public Health Association (“APHA”) has referred to the
services provided by public benefit programs as “the bedrock of the public health
infrastructure.”91 There is an “extensive body of research recognizing that
enrollment in public assistance programs contributes to positive health outcomes,
determinants/en/ [https://perma.cc/W84G-8FYG].
88. See Secretary’s Advisory Committee on National Health Promotion and Disease
Prevention Objectives for 2020, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (July 26, 2010),
http://www.healthypeople.gov/2010/hp2020/advisory/SocietalDeterminantsHealth.htm
[https://perma.cc/F7C3-DXNX]; Scott Burris, Law in a Social Determinants Strategy: A Public
Health Law Research Perspective, 126 PUB. HEALTH REP. 22, 26 (2011) (“There is unquestionably
a need for more study of social determinants, their complex role in causing health outcomes, and
the effectiveness of policy changes in addressing them.”). 
89. Burris, supra note 88, at 26. 
90. Changes in federal policy regarding immigrant access to public benefits in the 1970s led
immigrant communities to delay care: “‘[w]ithin the tightly knit’ immigrant community ‘word
spread quickly about the danger of visits to health centers. Many people . . . heard of someone who
had been deported when they had sought . . . treatment at a health center.’ Medical students at
Irvine noted the dangers of delayed care. And the dean of the medical center reported feeling
‘disgust, shame, and anger’ at being pressured to ‘implement what are essentially immigration
service functions.’” Fox, supra note 61, at 1069 (describing a 1974 study of access to medical care
for undocumented immigrants in Orange County, California). In a forthcoming work, I plan to
explore this phenomenon of “health care system avoidance” among noncitizens in detail. 
91. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n, supra note 8. 
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economic mobility, and self-sufficiency.”92 The public benefit programs that DHS
proposes to consider in public charge determinations impact public health in
many ways. 
Access to affordable health insurance supports public health. Medicaid, the
means-tested public health insurance program, is “an essential source of health
insurance for low-income individuals and families, children, pregnant women,
individuals with disabilities, and other underserved population groups” in the
United States, covering one-fifth of the population.93 Health coverage enables
enrollees to access a wide array of health services they otherwise might not be
able to afford.94 For example, studies have found that Medicaid increases access
to preventative care such as well-child visits and cancer screenings,95 and that it
is associated with a broad array of improved health outcomes, from fewer
hospitalizations96 and emergency department visits97 to improved oral health.98 
Access to health coverage through Medicaid also lifts families out of poverty,
which can shield children from adverse experiences and “toxic stress” that can
92. Id. 
93. Nat’l Health Law Program Team, National Health Law Program Comments Filed on
Proposed Public Charge Rule Change, NAT’L. HEALTH L. PROGRAM (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://healthlaw.org/resource/national-health-law-program-comments-filed-on-proposed-public-
charge-rule/ [https://perma.cc/R2M9-G9J6]. 
94. Id. 
95. Julia Paradise, Data Note: Three Findings about Access to Care and Health Outcomes
in Medicaid, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-
brief/data-note-three-findings-about-access-to-care-and-health-outcomes-in-medicaid/
[https://perma.cc/9HVG-MF9A]. 
96. Sarah Miller & Laura R. Wherry, The Long-Term Effects of Early Life Medicaid
Coverage 3-4 (2015), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mille/MillerWherry_Prenatal2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9QLC-UBAZ] (finding that “in utero Medicaid coverage lowers hospitalizations
for conditions that have been previously shown to be sensitive to the in utero environment”). 
97. Laura R. Wherry et al., Childhood Medicaid Coverage and Later Life Health Care
Utilization, 287 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No 20929, 2015),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w20929.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5XR-BP3Z] (finding that more years
of childhood eligibility for Medicaid among blacks is associated with a 7% to 15% decrease in
hospitalizations and 2% to 5% decrease in emergency department visits). 
98. Brandy J. Lipton et al., Previous Medicaid Expansion May Have Had Lasting Positive
Effects on Oral Health of Non-Hispanic Black Children, 35 HEALTH AFF. 2249, 2249 (2016),
h t tps:/ /www.academyhealth .org/f iles/Hea lth % 2 0 Aff -2 0 1 6 -Lip ton-2249-58 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/8V7C-8CPY]. For a review of studies examining the impact of Medicaid
expansion, see Olena Mazurenko et al., The Effects of Medicaid Expansion under the ACA: A
Systematic Review, 37 HEALTH AFF. 944 (2018); and Larisa Antonisse et al., The Effects of
Medicaid Expansion under the ACA: Updated Findings from a Literature Review, HENRY J. KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-effects-of-medicaid-
expansion-under-the-aca-updated-findings-from-a-literatu re-review-march-2018/
[https://perma.cc/DUF5-JX6Z] (finding that “multiple new studies demonstrate a positive
association between expansion and health outcomes.”).  
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affect their health later in life.99 Ultimately, Medicaid has been found to improve
population health through its positive effects on enrollees’ health behaviors,
access to care, and health outcomes.100 The compound effect of Medicaid
coverage is improved socioeconomic mobility for children.101 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP or food stamps) is
the nation’s largest and most important anti-hunger program; in 2015, SNAP
lifted 8.4 million people out of poverty, reducing the poverty rate by 17
percent.102 By supplementing the food budgets of millions of families across the
country, SNAP “improves dietary quality, protects against obesity, and improves
health, especially among children.”103 Food insecurity is associated with common
and costly health problems such as diabetes, heart disease, obesity, hypertension,
chronic kidney disease, and depression.104 By addressing food insecurity directly,
SNAP is an important piece of a public health strategy to reduce the incidence of
these common and costly health problems.105  
Public housing programs subsidize the cost of rent for low-income tenants in
order to counter the effects of housing instability.106 Such programs are “a critical
99. Karina Wagnerman, Alisa Chester, & Joan Alker, Medicaid is a Smart Investment in
Children, GEO. U. HEALTH POL’Y INST. CTR. FOR CHILD. AND FAMILIES (Mar. 2017),
https://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/MedicaidSmartInvestment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NZ2J-J3FY].
100. Sara R. Collins, Munira Z. Gunja, Michelle M. Doty, & Sophie Beutel, Americans’
Experiences with ACA Marketplace and Medicaid Coverage: Access to Care and Satisfaction, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 25, 2016) https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-
briefs/2016/may/americans-experiences-aca-marketplace-and-medicaid-coverage
[https://perma.cc/4HUK-SFCT]. 
101. Sarah Miller & Laura R. Wherry, The Long-Term Effects of Early Life Medicaid
Coverage, J. HUM. RESOURCES (2018). 
102. LAURA WHEATON & VICTORIA TRAN, THE ANTIPOVERTY EFFECTS OF THE
SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (2018) https://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/publication/96521/the_antipoverty_effects_of_the_supplemental_nutrition_assistan
ce_program_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTQ2-SA9S]. 
103. FOOD RES. & ACTION CTR., THE ROLE OF SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM IN IMPROVING HEALTH AND WELL-BEING (2017), http://frac.org/wp-content/uploads/
hunger-health-role-snap-improving-health-well-being.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH6J-PDL5]. 
104. Id. 
105. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress, in order to promote
the general welfare, to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation’s population by raising
levels of nutrition among low-income households . . . [t]o alleviate such hunger and malnutrition,
a supplemental nutrition assistance program is herein authorized which will permit low-income
households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of trade by increasing food
purchasing power for all eligible households who apply for participation.”); The Food Stamp Act
of 1964, 88 Pub. L. No. 525, 78 Stat. 703; FOOD RES. & ACTION CTR., supra note 103.
106. Housing Instability, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-
objectives/topic/social-determinants-health/interventions-resources/housing-instability#6
[https://perma.cc/26KA-PHKS]. 
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lifeline” to recipients who are living through a national affordable housing crisis
that is expected to continue growing.107 The National Housing Law Project
reports that “[h]aving safe and stable housing is crucial to a person’s good health,
their ability to sustain employment, and overall self-sufficiency.”108 A body of
research shows that housing instability causes increased hospital visits, mental
health problems, and loss of employment, and that it negatively impacts
children’s cognitive development.109 By subsidizing the cost of housing, public
housing programs directly address the root cause of housing instability.
Public benefits that provide or subsidize the costs of health care, food, and
housing work together to ensure stability for working families.110 For example,
families that are able to access housing assistance and nutrition benefits are 72
percent more likely to experience housing stability.111 Similarly, individuals with
access to affordable health coverage are 25 percent less likely to miss a rent
payment.112 
While each public benefit program described here has been shown to have
positive impacts on public health, their combined impact is greater than their sum.
Together, they “serve as investments in social and individual well-being and
future productivity.”113
107. Nat’l Housing Law Project, Comments in Response to Proposed Rulemaking:
Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds 1, 3 (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nhlp.org/wp-
c o n t e n t / u p lo a d s /N H LP -C om men t s -on -P roposed-R u le -on -P u blic -C h arge .pdf
[https://perma.cc/L42L-A4TJ].
108. Id. at 4-5. 
109. See Will Fischer, Research Shows Housing Vouchers Reduce Hardship and Provide
Platform for Long-Term Gains Among Children, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/research-shows-housing-vouchers-reduce-hardship-and-
provide-platform-for-long-term [https://perma.cc/Z2CS-3CLC] (last updated Oct. 7, 2015); LINDA
GIANNARELLI ET AL., REDUCING CHILD POVERTY IN THE US: COSTS AND IMPACTS OF POLICIES
PROPOSED BY THE CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND (Jan. 2015), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/
files/publication/39141/2000086-Reducing-Child-Poverty-in-the-US.pdf [https://perma.cc/49TM-
FDKF]; HEATHER SANDSTROM & SANDRA HUERTA, THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF INSTABILITY ON
CHILD DEVELOPMENT: A RESEARCH SYNTHESIS (2013), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/
files/publication/32706/412899-The-Negative-Effects-of-Instability-on-Child-Development-A-
Research-Synthesis.PDF [https://perma.cc/7MHX-7KXS].
110. Nat’l Housing Law Project, supra note 107, at 6.
111. Megan Sandel et al., Co-enrollment for Child Health: How Receipt and Loss of Food and
Housing Subsidies Relate to Housing Security and Statutes for Streamlined, Multi-subsidy
Application, 5 J. APPLIED RES. ON CHILD. 2, 7 (2014). 
112. Kriston Capps, For the Poor, Obamacare Can Reduce Late Rent Payments, CITYLAB
(Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/12/obamacare-health-insurance-housing-rent-
payments/577099/ [https://perma.cc/MKD3-Y7PU].
113. Nat’l Housing Law Project, supra note 107, at 10.
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B. Chilling Effects
The nexus of immigration law and public benefits law is incredibly
complex.114 Confusion about which immigrant statuses qualify for which benefits
is a frequent source of error at state welfare agencies.115 Likewise, noncitizens
themselves are often unaware of whether they qualify for various benefits,116 and
whether enrolling in public benefits could have negative consequences for future
immigration applications.117 Proposed expansions of the types of public benefits
that are considered in public charge determinations have sown confusion among
noncitizens and have been associated with a marked decrease in public benefits
enrollment.118 This effect is observed in noncitizens who are directly impacted by
114. See, e.g., Andrew Hammond, The Immigration-Welfare Nexus in a New Era?, 22 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 501, 503 (2018) (“mapping the unpredictable landscape of noncitizen eligibility
for public benefits”); TANYA BOOKER, AVIDEH MOUSSAVIAN, & JONATHAN BLAZER, Overview of
Immigrant Eligibility for Federal Programs, NILC, 7, https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/12/overview-immeligfedprograms-2015-12-09.pdf  [https://perma.cc/39RC-L34K] (last
updated Dec. 2015) (“Confusion about eligibility rules pervades benefit agencies and immigrant
communities. The confusion stems from the complex interaction of the immigration and welfare
laws, differences in eligibility criteria for various state and federal programs, and a lack of adequate
training on the rules as clarified by federal agencies.”). 
115. Tanya Broder et al., Overview of Immigrant Eligibility for Federal Programs, National
Immigration Law Center, 7 (2015), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/overview-
immeligfedprograms-2015-12-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R7J-Y74Q]. (“[M]any . . . eligibility
workers have turned away eligible immigrants mistakenly.”); id. at 8 (describing how benefit
agencies sometimes misinterpret verification requirements relating to immigration or citizenship
status). There are credible reports that in the past, INS and State Department officials have
erroneously excluded persons from entering the United States under the public charge ground based
on their usage of non-cash public assistance. CLAUDIA SCHLOSBERG & DINAH WILEY, THE IMPACT
OF INS PUBLIC CHARGE DETERMINATIONS ON IMMIGRANT ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE (1998).
116. Broder et al., supra note 115, at 7. 
117. Id. (describing how “[t]he misapplication of [the] public charge ground of inadmissibility
immediately after [PRWORA] passed contributed significantly to the chilling effect on immigrants’
access to services”). 
118. See Neeraj Kaushal & Robert Kaestner, Welfare Reform and Health Insurance of
Immigrants, 40 HEALTH SERV. RES. 697 (Jun. 2005), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC1361164/ [https://perma.cc/V6P4-EM44]; Michael E. Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, Trends in
Noncitizens’ and Citizens’ Use of Public Benefits Following Welfare Reform, Urb. Inst. (Mar. 1,
1999),  https://www.urban.org/research/publication/trends-noncitizens-and-citizens-use-public-
benefits-following-welfare-reform [https://perma.cc/VP4P-EPJ3]; Namratha R. Kandula et al., The
Unintended Impact of Welfare Reform on the Medicaid Enrollment of Eligible Immigrants, 39
HEALTH SERV. RES. 1509 (Oct. 2004), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1361081/
[https://perma.cc/KD3Z-ATLM]; Rachel Benson Gold, Immigrants and Medicaid After Welfare
Reform, GUTTMACHER INST. (May 1, 2003),  https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2003/05/immigrants-
and-medicaid-after-welfare-reform [https://perma.cc/H7N5-LZCM]; Inadmissibility on Public
Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (proposed Oct. 10, 2018). In its proposed rule, DHS notes
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changes in law as well as by those who are not directly impacted.119 This latter
effect, in which noncitizens disenroll from or forgo enrollment in public benefits
for which they qualify is called a “chilling effect.”120 Uncertainty about possible
consequences of enrollment in public benefits drives the chilling effect.121 
Members of mixed-status families (families in which members have different
citizenship or immigration statuses) are particularly susceptible to the chilling
effect, because although some members of the family (e.g. U.S. citizens) may
qualify for benefits and are not subject to public charge, others may not be
eligible or may be subject to public charge, and this complexity may discourage
decision makers from applying for benefits for any member of the family.122
Children are particularly at risk of negative health consequences of this chilling
effect, because although noncitizen children are typically eligible for a broader
array of public benefits compared with adults, their parents tend to control
decisions about enrollment.123
Even if parents enroll their children in public benefits but choose not to enroll
themselves, any negative effects on parents’ health and well-being will inevitably
impact their children.124 Studies have found that early childhood exposure to
“toxic stress,” or “strong, frequent, and/or prolonged adversity . . . without
adequate adult support,” can interfere with brain development.125  Economic
that studies of the chilling effect of welfare reform in 1996 caused enrollment reductions in public
benefit programs ranging from 21-54%. 
119. See, e.g., Samantha Artiga et al., Estimated Impacts of the Proposed Public Charge Rule
on Immigrants and Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 3 (2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-
Brief-Estimated-Impacts-of-the-Proposed-Public-Charge-Rule-on-Immigrants-and-Medicaid
[https://perma.cc/2YLJ-375F].
120. See, e.g., Jeanne Batalova et al., Chilling Effects: The Expected Public Charge Rule and
Its Impact on Legal Immigrant Families’ Public Benefits Use, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (2018),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/ProposedPublicChargeRule_Fin
alWEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV8W-D4HU]. 
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Kathleen R. Page & Sarah Polk, Chilling Effect? Post-Election Health Care Use
by Undocumented and Mixed-Status Families, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. e20 (2017) (describing how,
post-PRWORA, undocumented immigrant parents declined to enroll their U.S. citizen children in
public benefits because they were “reluctant to interact with staff at public agencies or to enter their
information in government databases”); id. (predicting that the current “climate of deportation may
dampen the use of existing resources, even among eligible people”). 
123. Id. 
124. Steven D. Cohen, Applying the Science of Child Development in Child Welfare Systems,
CTR. ON DEV. CHILD. HARV. U., 10-11 (OCT. 2016), http://www.caichildlaw.org/Misc/Dec2016_
RT_Harvard_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8WW-UYU7] (describing how parents of children who
have been abused or neglected are often facing powerful external stressors, and that public
assistance that helps them meet basic needs can “allow[] them to focus on longer-term priorities
such as building the skills needed to care effectively for their children.”).
125. Jack P. Shonkoff et al., The Lifelong Effects of Early Childhood Adversity and Toxic
Stress, AAP NEWS & JOURNALS GATEWAY, e236-37 (Jan. 2012), http://pediatrics.aappublications.
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instability, food insecurity, and health problems can exacerbate toxic stress
responses.126 
Changes in public charge law can undermine individual and population health
if people who are not subject to public charge consequences refuse to apply for
or disenroll from public benefits that support health, nutrition, and economic
stability. For example, one common misunderstanding of public charge is that it
applies when a lawful permanent resident applies for naturalization (to become
a U.S. citizen). This error was reported widely in the media following the release
of the proposed public charge rule in October 2018.127 Even some naturalized
U.S. citizens expressed concern over whether their receipt of public benefits
could put their U.S. citizenship at risk. 
The development of public charge policy has reflected a broad public policy
strategy of improving health and nutrition in order to help working-poor families
become self-sufficient.128 Law and policy that disincentivizes noncitizens from
enrolling in public benefits is a structural determinant of health that is predicted
to be extremely costly in the long term. 
C. Public Health Rationale
In its 1999 Field Guidance, INS made explicit the public health rationale
underlying its interpretation of the statutory provisions establishing the public
charge grounds of inadmissibility and deportability. At the outset, INS claimed
that its reasons for providing this interpretation to the public were “to reduce the
negative public health consequences generated by the existing confusion and to
provide aliens with better guidance as to the types of public benefits that will and
will not be considered in public charge determinations.”129 By “negative public
health consequences,” INS meant the result of noncitizens foregoing enrollment
org/content/129/1/e232 [https://perma.cc/7JGD-LP6X] (defining toxic stress); Toxic Stress, CTR.
ON DEV. CHILD. HARV. U., https://developingchild.harvard.edu/science/key-concepts/toxic-stress/
[https://perma.cc/V2R7-TUPP] (describing impact of toxic stress on brain architecture).
126. See, e.g., Excessive Stress Disrupts the Architecture of the Developing Brain, CTR. ON
DEV. CHILD. HARV. U., 3 (Jan. 2014), https://46y5eh11fhgw3ve3ytpwxt9r-wpengine.netdna-
ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2005/05/Stress_Disrupts_Architecture_Developing_Brain-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7D59-2SVD] (“Children who grow up in conditions of economic hardship often
exhibit elevated stress hormone levels.”). A characteristic toxic stress response is “strong, frequent,
or prolonged activation of the body’s stress management system.” Id. at 2. 
127. See, e.g., Khushbu Shah, Alarmist Reporting Turns Immigrants Away From Social
Services, Officials Say, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/
covering_the_health_care_fight/wic-immigrants.php [https://perma.cc/5GAU-5SRJ]; New “Public
Charge” Rules Shouldn’t Affect Travel Plans for Current Permanent Residents, SANCTUARY
SANTA CRUZ (Nov. 19, 2018), https://sanctuary-sc.net/cab-public-charge/ [https://perma.cc/AS78-
BR7N]. 
128. Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 101, 28,678
(1999). 
129. Id. at 28,689.
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in benefits due to fears of negative immigration consequences under the public
charge law.130 INS was particularly concerned about noncitizens’ fears of
accessing “emergency and other medical assistance, children’s immunizations,
and basic nutrition programs, as well as the treatment of communicable
diseases.”131 INS also noted that noncitizens were being deterred from other
health-supporting benefits such as child care and transportation vouchers.132
Hence, public health considerations were a motivating factor behind the standards
that the INS proposed in the 1999 Field Guidance, which remains the current
policy.  
III. THE PROPOSED PUBLIC CHARGE RULE AS A DEPARTURE FROM
LONGSTANDING POLICY
DHS released a proposed rule on October 10, 2018, that would dramatically
alter longstanding public charge policy in the inadmissibility context.133 The
intent of the proposed changes is “to better ensure that aliens subject to the public
charge inadmissibility ground are self-sufficient.”134 DHS purports to do this by
making the public charge test less discretionary and by expanding the number of
noncitizens who would be excluded under the public charge ground.135 The rule
aims to achieve some of the policy changes that the Trump administration has
unsuccessfully sought to implement through Congress, such as limiting family-
based immigration by moving to a “merit-based” immigration system.”
Notably, the rule would change the longstanding definitions of “public
charge” and “public benefit.” The proposed definition of “public charge” would
change the meaning of the term from “primarily dependent on the government”
to “an alien who receives one or more public benefits.”136 In addition, the
proposed rule expands the types of public benefits that would be considered in the
public charge determination.137 DHS describes this change as an improvement to
the current policy, which it considers to be “insufficiently protective of the public
budget, particularly in light of significant public expenditures on non-cash
benefits.”138 Historically, the only types of public benefits that have been
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 28,676. 
132. Id. at 28,677.
133. See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (proposed Oct. 10,
2018).
134. Id. at 51,116. 
135. See Proposed Change to Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/proposed-change-public-charge-ground-
inadmissibility/ [https://perma.cc/7PZQ-4VNV] (last updated Oct. 16, 2018) (stating that “there has
been insufficient guidance on how to determine if an alien who is applying for a visa, admission,
or adjustment of status is likely at any time to become a public charge”).
136. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,157-58.
137. See id. at 51,159.
138. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,164..
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considered in the analysis are those that provide cash benefits or long-term
institutionalization.139 The proposed rule would also consider use of non-
emergency Medicaid (with exceptions for certain disability-related services),
Premium and Cost Sharing Subsidies for Medicare Part D, the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and housing assistance such as public
housing and Section 8 vouchers.140 These benefit programs are vitally important
for supporting health, nutrition, and economic stability among low-income
households. In addition, the proposed rule provides more specific guidance on
how to weigh certain factors in the “totality of the circumstances” test. One such
guidance is to treat any public benefit enrollment within the previous thirty-six
months as a “heavily weighed negative factor.”141   
The following sections describe the predicted impact of the proposed rule on
public benefits enrollment among noncitizens, summarize the ways in which the
proposed rule represents a departure from longstanding public charge policy, and
caution against abandoning the public health rationale that has influenced the
development of public charge policy for over a century.
A. Predicted Impact
Comments submitted to DHS by prominent advocacy groups in response to
the proposed rule emphasize its predicted adverse effect on public health.142 A
major concern is the “chilling effect” of the proposed rule, i.e. that noncitizens
will be discouraged from accessing public benefits out of fear of, or confusion
about, negative immigration consequences.143 Research findings on the health
effects of prior changes in law that chilled access to public benefits predict that
the proposed rule would have a disproportionate impact on the health outcomes
of single mothers, pregnant women, and children.144 The chilling effect of the
139. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
140. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,164.
141. Id. at 51,199-200. 
142. See, e.g., CMS-9922-P, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Exchange Program
Integrity NPRM, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM (Jan. 8, 2019), https://9kqpw4dcaw91s37kozm5jx17-
wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/2019-Exchange-Program-Integrity-
Comments-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE36-T7U8]; DHS Docket No. USCIS-2010-0012, RIN
1615-AA22, Comments in Response to Proposed Rulemaking: Inadmissibility on Public Charge
Grounds, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, 4-5 (Dec. 10, 2018), https://apha.org/-/media/files/pdf/
advocacy/testimonyandcomments/181210_apha_public_charge_comments.ashx?la=en&hash=5
6A1A126FC49D31E1766368617B2284942A01B70 [https://perma.cc/7V4P-3ZVK]  (“The direct
impact and chilling effect of this proposed rule threatens to erode decades of progress made in
improving the public’s health.”). 
143. DHS Docket No. USCIS-2010-0012, RIN 1615-AA22, Comments in Response to Proposed
Rulemaking: Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, supra note 141.  
144. Paul Wise et al., Assessing the Effects of Welfare Reform Policies on Reproductive and
Infant Health, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1514 (1999); Kimberly Narain et al., The Impact of Welfare
Reform on the Health Insurance Coverage, Utilization and Health of Low Education Single
2019] THE PUBLIC CHARGE RULE AS PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY 199
proposed rule is expected to result in dire public health consequences such as
increases in maternal mortality, premature birth, low birth weight, behavioral and
emotional problems among children, mental health issues, metabolism-related
illnesses, and inflammatory diseases like arthritis.145 These negative health
outcomes are expected to cause disproportionate harm to people of color,
exacerbating existing disparities in health outcomes.146 
For some, fear of accessing public benefits arises from confusion about who
the current or proposed public charge policy affects, or which benefits are
considered in the public charge determination process. Media reports and
anecdotal evidence support the claim that confusion is the source of a decrease
in enrollment in public benefit programs by applicants for naturalization, by
ineligible parents on behalf of their U.S. citizen children, and by noncitizens of
all types enrolled in programs that are not considered in the inadmissibility
determination in the current or proposed rule.147 
For others, however, declining to enroll in or disenrolling from public benefit
programs—regardless of the impact of the current or proposed rule—may be
considered a rational response to the Trump administration’s pronouncements on
public charge, which date back to January 2017. At that time, a draft executive
order, “Protecting Taxpayer Resources by Ensuring Our Immigration Laws
Promote Accountability and Responsibility,” was leaked to the media.148 The
order, which was never signed or released, directed the Secretary of Homeland
Security to rescind existing field guidance on public charge and to propose a new
rule that “specifies that an alien is inadmissible as a public charge if he is likely
to receive, and is deportable as a public charge if he does receive, public benefits
for which eligibility or amount is determined in any way on the basis of income,
resources, or financial need[.]”149 For this reason, many noncitizens reasonably
anticipated a change in the rules that would penalize them for use of any means-
tested public benefit. Revisions to the Department of State’s Foreign Affairs
Manual in January 2018 reflected the policy preferences in the executive order
Mothers, 180 SOC. SCI. & MED. 28 (2017). 
145. CMS-9922-P, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Exchange Program Integrity
NPRM, supra note 141, at 57-61.  
146. Id. at 63-65. 
147. See, e.g., Helena Bottemiller Evich, Immigrants, Fearing Trump Crackdown, Drop Out
of Nutrition Programs, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/03/immigrants-nutrition-
food-trump-crackdown-8062922 [https://perma.cc/676B-2D34] (last updated Sept. 4, 2018, 1:29
PM.
148. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias & Dara Lind, Read Leaked Drafts of Four White House
Executive Orders on Muslim Ban, End to DREAMer Program, and More, VOX (Jan. 25, 2017, 5:43
PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/1/25/14390106/leaked-drafts-trump-
immigrants-executive-order [https://perma.cc/XB46-X5LH].
149. Memorandum from Andrew Bremburg, Assistant to the President and Dir. of the
Domestic Policy Council, to President Donald Trump (Jan. 23, 2017), https://cdn3.vox-cdn.com/
uploads/chorus_asset/file/7872571/Protecting_Taxpayer_Resources_by_Ensuring_Our_Immigr
ation_Laws_Promote_Accountability_and_Responsibility.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3KD-SPAP]. 
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by permitting its officials abroad to consider use of all public benefits by
applicants or their dependent family members in public charge assessments.150 In
February and March 2018, two drafts of a public charge rule were leaked to the
media; both drafts carried out the directive of the draft executive order to consider
use of any means-tested public benefit in the public charge assessment.151 Both
drafts also included use of public benefits by applicants’ dependent family
members, including U.S. citizen children.152 These periodic releases of
information, although questionably reliable, were in line with the Trump
Administration’s stated policy goal of reducing noncitizen enrollment in public
benefit programs. With this background, one can understand why a noncitizen
who is not subject to the current or proposed public charge policy would choose
to avoid the use of public benefits. There is a rational fear among noncitizens that
public charge policy could become more punitive over time or could be applied
retroactively. 
DHS acknowledges the possibility that its proposed rule could chill
immigrant enrollment in public benefits: 
Research shows that when eligibility rules change for public benefits
programs there is evidence of a “chilling effect” that discourages
immigrants from using public benefits programs for which they are still
eligible . . . [I]t is unclear how many individuals would actually disenroll
from or forego enrollment in public benefits programs due to the
proposed rule . . . PRWORA was directly changing eligibility
requirements whereas this proposed rule, if finalized, would change
enrollment incentives.153
If the proposed rule is finalized as written, noncitizens who will have to undergo
a public charge determination in the future will certainly be incentivized to refrain
from enrolling in certain benefits. This will be a difficult decision for some
families, as the American Public Health Association notes in its public comment
submitted in response to the proposed rule: “The fear generated by this rule
would put families in impossible situations where they are forced to choose
between keeping their families together or enrolling in programs to keep their
families healthy.”154 However, DHS fails to recognize that noncitizens who are
150. Access to Health Care, Food, and Other Public Programs for Immigrant Families Under
the Trump Administration, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.nilc.org/
issues/health-care/exec-orders-and-access-to-public-programs/ [https://perma.cc/L6Z7-P2BN]. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,266 (emphasis added). 
154. Comment Letter on Proposed Rulemaking: Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds
from Georges C. Benjamin, Executive Director of the American Public Health Association, to
Samantha Deshommes, Chief of the Regulatory Coordination Division of the Office of Policy and
Strategy at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, at 2
(Dec. 10, 2018), https://apha.org/-/media/files/pdf/advocacy/testimonyandcomments/181210_
apha_public_charge_comments.ashx [https://perma.cc/E26Z-T56L].  
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not subject to public charge inadmissibility would also be chilled from enrolling
in benefits.155 
It is estimated that if the proposed public charge role is finalized as written,
the magnitude of disenrollment caused by the chilling effect would dwarf the
number of noncitizens who are actually subject to public charge
inadmissibility.156 For example, disenrollment from Medicaid and the Children’s
Health Insurance Program on account of the proposed rule is estimated to be
between 2.1 and 4.9 million.157 This includes as many as two million eligible U.S.
citizen children with immigrant parents who disenroll out of fear of immigration-
related consequences.158 More tragically, it is possible that even if the proposed
public charge rule is never finalized as written, its major effect will be to have
chilled public benefits use for millions of noncitizens. A chilling effect has
already been observed in response to leaked drafts of the proposed public charge
rule.159 There are widespread reports of noncitizens avoiding public benefits use
out of fear of immigration consequences.160
155. See, e.g., Comment Letter on Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds from Elizabeth
G. Taylor, Executive Director of the National Health Law Program, to U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, at 44 (Dec. 10, 2018), https://
9kqpw4dcaw91s37kozm5jx17-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/National-
Health-Law-Program-Public-Charge-Comments-FINAL-12.10.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8SD-
4PVK] (NHeLP stating “DHS wrongly ignores the fact that family members and communities
surrounding noncitizens will stop using public benefits, even though they are not directly targeted
by the proposed rule.”).  
156. See, e.g., id. at 44 (estimating that “[t]he proposed rule will directly affect approximately
1.1 million individuals seeking to obtain lawful permanent resident (LPR) status” compared with
potentially “14 million noncitizens and their family members whose household incomes fall below
125 percent of [Federal Poverty Guidelines].”).  
157. ARTIGA ET AL., supra note 5.
158. SAMANTHA ARTIGA ET AL., POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF PUBLIC CHARGE CHANGES ON
HEALTH COVERAGE FOR CITIZEN CHILDREN (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2018),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Potential-Effects-of-Public-Charge-Changes-on-Health-
Coverage-for-Citizen-Children [https://perma.cc/XM9R-QQGP].
159. See, e.g., Evich, supra note 146; Taylor, supra note 154. 
160. See, e.g., Mitchell H. Katz & Dave A. Chokshi, The “Public Charge” Proposal and
Public Health Implications for Patients and Clinicians, JAMA (Oct. 1, 2018) https://
championprovider.ucsf.edu/sites/champion.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/JAMA%20The%20public%
20charge%20proposal%20Katz%2C%20M%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRL9-HSJD]; Evich,
supra note 146; Ileana Najarro & Jenny Deam, Fearing Deportation, Undocumented Immigrants
in Houston are Avoiding Hospitals and Clinics, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, https://www.
houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Fearing-deportation-undocumented-
immigrants-are-12450772.php [https://perma.cc/4DUQ-JPRV] (last updated Dec. 28, 2017, 11:00
A.M.).
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B. Disregard for Public Health Rationale
The proposed rule is premised on one of the dual principles that have endured
for more than a century of public charge policy: the desire to attract and retain
immigrants who will be self-sufficient through employment.161 However, in
drafting the rule, DHS ignored a critical insight that also has influenced the
development of public charge policy. This is the understanding that public
benefits play an important role in helping the working poor to become self-
sufficient in the long term by addressing SDoH, such as access to health care and
adequate nutrition. The development of public charge policy has historically
reflected a broad public policy strategy of improving health and nutrition in order
to help working-poor families become self-sufficient.162   
One indication of DHS’s oversight is the proposed change to the definition
of public charge, which shifts the focus of the analysis from dependence on
government support (“primarily dependent”) to any use of public benefits
(“receives one or more public benefits”).163 The proposed rule states that
enrollment in benefits “even in a relatively small amount or for a relatively short
duration would in many cases be sufficient to render a person a public charge.”164
This statement is inconsistent with historical understandings of dependence in the
public charge context and ignores evidence indicating the contributing role of
public benefits to long-term self-sufficiency. Mere use of public benefits,
divorced from any analysis of the degree to which such use indicates a need for
long-term support, has never been a focal point of the public charge analysis.
Receipt of health-supporting public benefits has been understood to supplement
the basic needs of working poor families and support them on the path to self-
sufficiency.165 As a result, in the inadmissibility context, use of public benefits is
one factor in the “totality of circumstances” test—a factor that is possible to
overcome if other evidence, such as employment history, indicates that the
applicant is not likely to become primarily dependent on the government for
support.166 
Similarly, the proposed rule’s inclusion of a broad array of public benefits in
the public charge determination disregards the connection between public
benefits, improved health, and long-term self-sufficiency by stating that use of
161. See Historians’ Comment passim, supra note 10.
162. Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28, 676, 28,
678. (May 26, 1999).
163. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,157-58.
164.  Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,164. This statement is
inconsistent with historical understandings of dependence in the public charge context and ignores
evidence indicating the contributing role of public benefits to long-term self-sufficiency.
165. Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 28, 692.
166. Application for Adjustment from Temporary to Permanent Resident Status, 8 C.F.R. §
245a.3(g)(4)(i)-(iii) (2019). 
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virtually any public benefit “evidence[s] a lack of self-sufficiency.”167 DHS
correctly notes that “[f]ood, shelter, and necessary medical treatment are basic
necessities of life.”168 However, it then jumps to the conclusion that “[a] person
who needs the public’s assistance to provide for these basic necessities is not self-
sufficient.”169 This conclusion relies on DHS’s definition of “self-sufficient,”
which refers to those who “do not depend on public resources to meet their needs,
but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources of their family, sponsor,
and private organizations.”170 This tautological reasoning ignores the substantial
evidence, upon which the INS relied in its 1999 Field Guidance, that people with
a broad range of incomes receive public benefits to subsidize basic necessities in
order to maintain good health and achieve self-sufficiency: “Certain Federal,
State, and local benefits are increasingly being made available to families with
incomes far above the poverty level, reflecting broad public policy decisions
about improving general health and nutrition, promoting education, and assisting
working-poor families in the process of becoming self-sufficient.”171 The ACA
represents the latest manifestation of this trend of expanding eligibility for public
benefits to a broader swath of families on the income spectrum. Its premium
subsidy for coverage purchased in the Health Insurance Marketplace is available
to households with resources up to 400 percent of the federal poverty line.172 This
reform addresses inefficiencies in the health insurance market that would
otherwise make health insurance unaffordable.
In the proposed rule, DHS acknowledges that its changes will likely cause
great harm to individuals, families, and communities.173 Specifically, it states that
disenrollment and foregone enrollment in public benefits will likely lead to:
• Worse health outcomes, including increased prevalence of obesity and
malnutrition, especially for pregnant or breastfeeding women, infants, or
children, and reduced prescription adherence;
• Increased use of emergency rooms and emergent care as a method of
primary health care due to delayed treatment;
• Increased prevalence of communicable diseases, including among
members of the U.S. citizen population who are not vaccinated;
• Increases in uncompensated care in which a treatment or service is not
paid for by an insurer or patient; 
• Increased rates of poverty and housing instability; and
167. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114, 51,159 (Oct. 10, 2018)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245 and 248) (DHS proposes that some short-
term or very small dollar amount of benefits may be excluded from public charge determinations). 
168. Id. at 51,159. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 51,122.
171. Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,678.
172. Internal Revenue Service, Eligibility for the Premium Tax Credit, https://www.irs.gov/
affordable-care-act/individuals-and-families/eligibility-for-the-premium-tax-credit
[https://perma.cc/5B2B-FEK9] (last updated Feb. 14, 2019).
173. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,270. 
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• Reduced productivity and educational attainment.174
Despite acknowledging these explicit harms, and “the importance of
increasing access to health care and helping people to become self-sufficient in
certain contexts (such as respect to other agencies’ administration of government
assistance programs),” DHS concludes that it is not required to advance those
goals through public charge policy.175 However, this statement is explicitly
counter to its predecessor agency’s interpretation of the decades-long history of
public charge policy. Moreover, it devalues larger developments in social welfare
and public health policy that have sought to improve access to health care and
health-supporting public benefits among all members of the community, and
specifically for vulnerable members of the community. Such policies, which
increase government spending on public benefits, are justified by their net
economic benefits for society.
The proposed rule reflects a divergent agenda, devoted to slashing enrollment
in health-supporting public benefits among citizens and noncitizens alike in the
name of “self-sufficiency.” This broader agenda is evident in an executive order
signed by President Trump in April 2018, which announced policy support for
strengthening work requirements in programs across the welfare system.176 The
Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) had already taken this position,
releasing policy guidance in January 2018 to support state efforts to impose work
or community engagement (volunteer) requirements as a condition of Medicaid
eligibility.177 CMS’s policy guidance grossly misinterprets the relationship
between public benefits, health outcomes, and self-sufficiency. It justifies its
position based on studies indicating that employment and community engagement
are correlated with improved health outcomes.178 However, researchers have
cautioned against drawing the conclusion that work requirements would help to
improve health and well-being among Medicaid beneficiaries; this is because
correlation does not imply causation and evidence on the effect of employment
174. Id.  
175. Id. at 51,158, n. 258.
176. Executive Order Reducing Poverty in America by Promoting Opportunity and Economic
Mobility, 83 Fed. Reg. 15941 (Apr. 10, 2018). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) had
already begun reviewing its options for stricter work requirements for recipients of SNAP on the
date that the executive order was signed. In February 2019, USDA proposed a rule to broaden its
work requirement, with the goal of “moving more able-bodied recipients of [SNAP] benefits to
self-sufficiency through the dignity of work.” Proposed Rule: SNAP Requirements for Able-Bodied
Adults Without Dependents, USDA, https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/fr-020119 [https://perma.cc/
Z4N7-UKDJ].  
177. Letter from Brian Neale, Deputy Administrator and Director, Center for Medicaid and
CHIP, to State Medicaid Directors (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-
guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KKY-YSWS]. Support for work
requirements in Medicaid represents a major shift in policy, as CMS had rejected state requests to
impose such requirements in the past. Id. at 3. 
178. Id. at 2, 3, 7. 
2019] THE PUBLIC CHARGE RULE AS PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY 205
on health is limited.179
There is much stronger evidence relating to the opposite effect: that access
to subsidized health insurance such as Medicaid enables low-wage workers to
obtain and retain employment.180 Research consistently shows that Medicaid
enrollment is associated with “improved financial well-being, not a lack of self-
sufficiency.”181 Indeed, Medicaid enrollment “produces net positives for the
public budget over time both by increasing revenue collection and by decreasing
government expenditures for incomes supports and costs of delayed and
uncompensated care”—a conclusion that contrasts sharply with the cost-cutting
rationale used to justify the administration’s proposed policies in the immigration
and welfare contexts.182 In addition, experts in poverty law and policy have
strongly denounced work requirements in welfare programs, characterizing them
as “ill-informed, ineffective, inefficient, and inequitable.”183 
Nevertheless, as of January 2019, sixteen states have applied to the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS) for Section 1115 Medicaid demonstration
waivers that would permit them to condition Medicaid on meeting a work
requirement.184 One state, Arkansas, has implemented its work requirement, and
an early analysis shows that few people obtained new jobs and many people lost
their health insurance as a result of the requirement.185 In March 2019, Judge
James E. Boasberg of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled
against the Secretary’s approval of work requirements in Arkansas and Kentucky
in two separate opinions and halted the implementation of the work requirement
in Arkansas.186 In both cases, the Court found that the Secretary failed to address
the programs’ potential to cause substantial numbers of people to lose their health
179. See, e.g., LARISA ANTONISSE AND RACHEL GARFIELD, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
WORK AND HEALTH: FINDINGS FROM A LITERATURE REVIEW (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation,
2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-The-Relationship-Between-Work-and-Health-
Findings-from-a-Literature%20Review [https://perma.cc/Z754-JZXN]; Heather HAHN ET AL.,
WORK REQUIREMENTS IN SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAMS (Urban Institute, 2017) https://www.
urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/95566/work-requirements-social-safety-net-programs_4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HMB8-KLSH].
180. ANTONISSE & GARFIELD, supra note 177.
181. Taylor, supra note 154, at 10.
182. Id. at 12.
183. See, e.g., GRANT ET AL., UNWORKABLE & UNWISE: CONDITIONING ACCESS TO PROGRAMS
THAT ENSURE A BASIC FOUNDATION FOR FAMILIES ON WORK REQUIREMENTS (Georgetown Center
on Poverty and Inequality, 2019) http://www.georgetownpoverty.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/
02/Unworkable-Unwise-20190201.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7ZP-QVEM].
184. Id. at 11.
185. AN EARLY LOOK AT THE IMPACT: NEW MEDICAID WORK REQUIREMENT HURTS HEALTH
COVERAGE IN ARKANSAS 3 (Arkansas Advocates for Children & Families, 2018), http://www.
aradvocates.org/publications/medicaid-work-requirement-arkansas-hurts-health-coverage/
[https://perma.cc/DHZ6-GTNA]. 
186. Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Stewart v. Azar (“Stewart II”),
2019 WL 1375496 (D.C. Cir.).
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coverage.187 This effect would contradict the main purpose of Medicaid, which
is to provide medical assistance to people who cannot afford it.188
Significantly, in both opinions the Court explicitly recognizes the role of
health coverage in promoting financial self-sufficiency. In Gresham v. Azar, the
challenge to the approval of the Arkansas Works Amendments, the opinion opens
with the story of Adrian McGonigal, an Arkansas resident who was terminated
from Medicaid for failure to report his employment.189 As a result, he was unable
to afford his prescriptions, his health conditions flared up, he missed several days
of work, and was ultimately fired by his employer because of his absences.190 In
Stewart II, the Court notes that even if self-sufficiency were an objective of
Medicaid and “some number of beneficiaries were to gain independence, the
Secretary does not weigh the benefits of their self-sufficiency against the
consequences of coverage loss, which would harm and undermine the financial
self-sufficiency of others.”191
By including Medicaid among the benefits to be considered in the public
charge determination, the proposed rule implicitly discourages low-wage
noncitizen workers from enrolling in health benefits that can shield them from
risks of job loss that are associated with untreated health care needs.192 The
Trump administration’s selective reading of the body of the body of evidence on
the relationship between work and health suggests that its agenda is not really
motivated by a long-term strategy to reduce government spending on public
benefits. 
Another reason to suspect that economic efficiency is not the true driver of
the proposed public charge rule is DHS’s inclusion of federal housing assistance
programs among the benefits to be considered in the public charge
determination.193 DHS cites statistics on noncitizen enrollment in federal housing
assistance programs to support its decision.194 However, DHS acknowledges that
the statistics indicate that “noncitizen participation in these programs is currently
187.  Stewart II, 2019 WL 1375496 at 14; Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 at 18-20.
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (describing the purpose of Medicaid). In approving Kentucky’s
waiver, the HHS Secretary relied, in part, on an objective external to the program’s purpose:
“financial self-sufficiency.” Stewart II, 2019 WL 1375496 at 29. The Secretary did not rely on this
objective in approving Arkansas’ waiver, but did respond to public comments opposing the work
requirements by stating that they “create appropriate incentives for beneficiaries to gain
employment.” Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 at 18 (quoting Letter from Seema Verma,
Administrator, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., to Cindy Gillespie, Director, Ark. Dep’t of
Human Serv. 5 (Mar. 5, 2018)); id. at 25 (“Nowhere in the Secretary’s approval letter does he
justify his decision based on . . . a belief that the project will help Medicaid-eligible persons to gain
sufficient financial resources to be able to purchase private insurance.”).
189. Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 at 1-2.
190. Id.
191. Stewart II, 2019 WL 1375496 at 33.
192. See ANTONISSE & GARFIELD, supra note 177. 
193. See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,158-9.
194. Id. at 51,167. 
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relatively low.”195 Indeed, only 0.2% of noncitizens lived in Section 8 housing,
while 0.4% of noncitizens lived in other federally subsidized housing.196 Through
the lens that DHS has constructed in the proposed rule, these statistics should be
interpreted to mean that noncitizens are generally self-sufficient in paying for
housing and are therefore not responsible for significant expenditures on federal
housing assistance programs. They indicate that the public funds devoted to
subsidized housing are adequately protected by existing eligibility restrictions
that prevent noncitizens from enrolling in these programs. Nevertheless, DHS
proposes to include federal housing assistance programs because “the total
Federal expenditure for the programs overall remains significant” and because
“they relate to a basic living need (i.e., shelter).”197 Indeed, the cost of
administering the proposed rule would likely exceed the federal funds that would
be saved by including federal housing assistance programs in the public charge
determination. By hyper-focusing on noncitizen use of public benefits to the
exclusion of analyses of long-term self-sufficiency and impact on public
resources, the proposed rule departs dramatically from the history and purpose of
public charge.198 
The current administration has framed its proposed public charge rule as a
way to promote self-sufficiency among noncitizens by discouraging them from
enrolling in safety net programs.199 Incidentally, they claim, the new policy would
reduce federal and state government expenditures on public benefits.200 However,
this Section has described reasons to infer that economic efficiency is not a
genuine motivation for the proposed public charge rule. In the context of
President Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric and the accompanying rise of
nativism, the proposed rule should be considered one strand of the
195. Id. 
196. See id.   
197. Id. 
198. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, DHS Announces New Proposed
Immigration Rule to Enforce Long-Standing Law that Promotes Self-Sufficiency and Protects
American Taxpayers (Sept. 22, 2018) https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/09/22/dhs-announces-new-
proposed-immigration-rule-enforce-long-standing-law-promotes-self [https://perma.cc/HP86-
SYYB]. DHS’s stated justification for the proposed rule is that the change would enable it to better
carry out the Congressional intent of the public charge law, which DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen
describes as “promot[ing] immigrant self-sufficiency and protect[ing] finite resources” Id. I have
described how the proposed changes to public charge policy do not appear to be calculated to
achieve these ends. If the proposed rule is finalized as written, there is an argument to be made that
DHS has exceeded its rulemaking power in promulgating the public charge rule. This topic is ripe
for future exploration but is beyond the scope of this Essay.
199. See, e.g., 83 Fed. Reg. 51,116 (“DHS seeks to better ensure that aliens subject to the
public charge inadmissibility ground are self-sufficient, i.e., do not depend on public resources to
meet their needs.”).
200. Id. at 51,122 (estimating that the changes would reduce federal and state government
transfer payments by $2.27 billion annually).
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administration’s “self-deportation” policy agenda.201 Self-deportation is “a variety
of state-sponsored coercive removal that assigns some agency to individuals in
their own departure.”202 In practice, it involves legislating and regulating to make
every aspect of life difficult for noncitizens so that they “self-deport” or avoid
entering the country at all.203 By restricting or discouraging access to public
benefits, the proposed rule has already inflicted suffering on millions of people
living in the United States. From that perspective, regardless of whether the rule
is finalized as written, it has already done its job.
C. The Normative Case
The second principle underlying public charge policy is the commitment to
support members of the community who fall on hard times.204 As I have written
elsewhere, noncitizens living in the United States are embedded in multiple
overlapping and complex networks within American society.205 The noncitizens
who are most likely to be affected by the proposed public charge rule are those
who are applying for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status, who have
lived in the United States for several years, and who have close personal and
professional ties with U.S. citizens.206 They almost certainly live among citizens,
attend school with citizens, work side-by-side with citizens; they have paid taxes
to fund public programs that promote the general welfare; they have family
members who are citizens. In short, they would be considered members of the
community by their neighbors, colleagues, classmates, and family. Like many
U.S. citizens, they may have fallen on hard times and relied on public benefits to
supplement their income. 
Insofar as solidarity with members of our communities is still considered a
social good, and public benefits are recognized as a stepping stone to economic
security rather than evidence of moral failure, public charge policy should
continue to allow noncitizens to enroll in most public benefits without fear of
201. For a comprehensive history and analysis of self-deportation as a government strategy,
see K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation (2018) (manuscript on file with author). 
202. Id. at 5-6. 
203. See id. at 3 (quoting former Alabama state Representative Micky Hammon, who
explained that H.B. 56, a law requiring police to attempt to determine a person’s legal status if they
have reasonable suspicion that the person is unlawfully present, was designed “[t]o make it difficult
for them to live here so they will deport themselves”). 
204. See Historians’ Comment passim, supra note 10. 
205. Makhlouf, supra note 71, at 293-94 (2019).
206. In the context of noncitizen access to health care, solidarity-based arguments have certain
limitations, described in detail in PATRICIA ILLINGWORTH & WENDY E. PARMET, THE HEALTH OF
NEWCOMERS: IMMIGRATION, HEALTH POLICY, AND THE CASE FOR GLOBAL SOLIDARITY (2017). For
example, such arguments tend to rely on exclusivity—in this case, seeming to favor noncitizens
who have resided in the United States for longer periods. Although it would be possible to extend
my normative argument to noncitizens seeking admission from overseas, I do not attempt to do so
here, as it is beyond the scope of this Essay.
2019] THE PUBLIC CHARGE RULE AS PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY 209
negative immigration consequences. Enabling access to health-supporting public
benefits for all members of the community is not only critical for ensuring the
long-term wellbeing of us all—it also embodies a moral commitment to solidarity
with and compassion for the people who live among us. 
CONCLUSION
Public charge law and policy have determined the admissibility and
deportability of noncitizens ever since the federal government began
comprehensively regulating immigration. Public charge policy has remained
remarkably consistent over time, adhering to its dual principles: an effort to
promote the entry of able-bodied and employable immigrants and, importantly,
a commitment to assist members of the community who fall on hard times.
Concern for public health has influenced the development of public charge policy
over time. However, the changes to public charge policy proposed in October
2018 represent a departure from the policy’s dual principles and its consideration
of public health concerns. Rather, the proposed changes are tied to a broader
agenda to restrict access to health-supporting public benefits generally, among
citizens and noncitizens alike.
